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Abstract—This work explores the extent to which LSB embed-
ding can be made secure against structural steganalysis through
a modification of cover image statistics prior to message em-
bedding. Natural images possess symmetries that are expressed
through approximately equal cardinalities of certain sets of k-
tuples of consecutive pixels. LSB embedding disturbs this balance
and a kth-order structural attack infers the presence of a hidden
message with a length in proportion to the size of the imbalance
amongst sets of k-tuples. To protect against kth-order structural
attacks, cover modifications involve the redistribution of k-tuples
among the different sets so that symmetries of the cover image
are broken, then repaired through the act of LSB embedding
so that the stego image bears the statistics of the original cover.
To protect against all orders up to some order k, the statistics
of n-tuples must be preserved where n is the least common
multiple of all orders ≤ k. We find that this is only feasible
for securing against up to 3rd-order attacks (Sample Pairs and
Triples analyses) since higher-order protections result in virtually
zero embedding capacities. Securing up to 3rd-order requires
redistribution of sextuplets: rather than perform these 6th-order
cover modifications, which result in tiny embedding capacities,
we reduce the problem to the redistribution of triplets in a
manner that also preserves the statistics of pairs. This is done by
embedding into only certain pixels of each sextuplet, constraining
the maximum embedding rate to be ≤ 2/3 bits per channel.
Testing on a variety of image formats, we report best performance
for JPEG-compressed images with a mean maximum embedding
rate undetectable by 2nd- and 3rd-order attacks of 0.21 bits per
channel.
Index Terms—LSB embedding, structural steganalysis
I. INTRODUCTION
Hiding secret messages in the least significant bits of pixels
in digital images is the oldest steganographic technique. It
follows a simple rule: to embed a message bit into a pixel of
value x, flip the pixel’s least significant bit (LSB) to match
the message bit,
flip(x) =
{
x+ 1 for x even
x− 1 for x odd. (1)
The beauty of this technique is the simplicity of message
retrieval: one needs merely to read off the LSBs of the pixels
(perhaps scrambled in some way) to obtain the hidden mes-
sage. No special software or complex operations are needed.
Since only the LSBs of only some pixels are modified, LSB
embedding is also virtually impossible to detect visually. Alas,
it does tend to affect pixel value statistics in an idiosyncratic
way: even-valued pixels only ever increase by one, and odd-
valued pixels only ever decrease by one. This asymmetry has
given rise to a barrage of steganalytic attacks over the last two
decades, starting in 2000 with the histogram attack [1] which
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seeks to detect LSB embedding by examining the extent to
which neighboring bins in the image’s pixel value histogram
tend to equality as a result of this embedding asymmetry. This
attack only works well for high embedding rates, and so new
techniques looking for changes in higher-order statistics, like
correlations among neighboring pixel values, were developed
[2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8]. These powerful methods are
generally referred to as structural steganalysis, because they
target the statistical properties of image structures (like pixel
pairs, triplets, and so on). The most sensitive attacks in this
family are able to detect embedding rates as low as 3% [6],
and are more accurate than other prominent attacks against
LSB embedding [9], [10], [11], [12], [13] for certain image
formats, like JPEG-compressed images.
A small change to the embedding rule—one that does
not exhibit the asymmetry of Eq. (1)—greatly enhances the
security of LSB steganography. LSB matching [14], in which
pixel values are randomly changed by ±1 so that their LSBs
match message bits, has been widely explored as an equally
elegant, greatly more secure alternative to LSB embedding.
LSB matching has been paired with encoding schemes [15],
[16], [17], [18] to reduce the number of modified pixels,
and adaptive embedding strategies which select pixels for
modification that minimize some measure of distortion [19],
[20], [21]. Distortion measures derived from features in the
frequency and wavelet domains have led to some of the
most secure algorithms, including Wavelet Obtained Weights
(WOW) [22], Spatial-Universal Wavelet Relative Distortion
(UNIWARD) [23], and the Multivariate Gaussian Model of
[24].
With more sophisticated steganography came more sophisti-
cated steganalysis. In recent years, powerful, high-dimensional
blind steganalytic techniques [25], [26], [27], [28] based on
machine learning [29], [30], [31] have begun to gain some
inroads against even these algorithms. The machine learning-
based technique of [32] built on features derived from the
co-occurrences of neighboring noise residuals, attacks LSB
embedding and performs better than the traditional, targeted
approaches discussed above. But, the improved accuracy of
these methods comes at the cost of increased computational
overhead in terms of feature selection and engineering, and
model training. Traditional attacks like structural steganalysis
therefore remain popular and efficient options for first-line
defense against LSB embedding.
Despite the greatly improved security offered by modern
methods, LSB embedding remains widely used. It is found in
a great number of open source and commercial data hiding
products [32]; it is simple enough to be implemented with an
80-character Perl code at the Linux command-line [6]. Just
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2as little effort is required of the recipient in extracting the
message. This is not the case with the most secure adaptive
methods, which require relatively complex software routines,
more computational time, and in many cases additional secret
data for complete message extraction. Due to its continued
relevance, there has been some effort in recent years to
improve the security of LSB embedding against some of
the more successful traditional attacks [33], [34], [35], [36],
[37], [38], [39], [40]. These efforts have primarily targeted
the RS [2] and Sample Pairs analysis (SPA) [3], [4], and
have generally sought to evade them by preserving the image
statistics they target either by manipulating them prior to or
after embedding, or via embedding strategies that preserve
them in place. We will discuss these works in detail in the
next section, but their primary deficiency is that most fail to
protect LSB embedding from higher-order structural attacks,
like the Triples analysis of [7] based on the statistics of pixel
triplets. Triples analysis can accurately detect low-to-moderate
embedding rates, and, of the traditional steganalytic techniques
against LSB embedding, it performs best against certain image
types, like JPEG-compressed raster images. Those approaches
that do appear to offer such higher-order protections (like [35],
[37]) either create additional statistical artifacts that could be
attacked, or require considerable supplemental private data for
successful message extraction.
In this work, we seek a means of securing LSB embedding
against higher-order structural steganalysis, including both
SPA and Triples analysis, that 1) does not produce unintended
statistical artifacts, 2) does not require significant additional
secret data for message recovery, and 3) preserves the com-
putational and algorithmic simplicity of LSB embedding.
Structural steganalysis is based on the idea that the car-
dinalities of certain sets of consecutive pixel groups (pairs,
triplets, etc) should be approximately equal for natural images,
but diverge in an idiosyncratic way under LSB embedding.
Structural attacks analyze the count statistics of these pixel
groups and render an estimate of the hidden message length
in proportion to this divergence. In this work, we consider
cover modification, in which pixels groups are redistributed
in the cover image in such a way that their count statistics
return to normal after LSB embedding. With apparently nor-
mal set cardinalities, structural analyzers will be fooled into
concluding that no hidden message is present. This kind of
cover modification was presented as a defense against SPA in
[40], and we extend it here to include Triples analysis. This
extension is not straight-forward: to protect against all orders
up to some order k, the statistics of n-tuples must be preserved,
where n is the least common multiple of all orders up to
and including k. We find that cover modifications in terms
of sextuplets, required to preserve the statistics of both pairs
and triplets, are highly constrained and result in cover images
with virtually zero embedding capacity. We demonstrate how
to instead perform cover modifications at third-order, which is
much less constrained, by redistributing triplets in such a way
that also preserves the statistics of pairs. The trade-off is that
only certain pixels in the image can be embedded.
We test this method against a range of different image
types and find that we can achieve maximum undetectable
embedding rates of 0.12, 0.17, and 0.21 bits per channel
for uncompressed grayscale, uncompressed color, and JPEG-
compressed color raster images. We also argue that extending
protections to higher-order (quadruples analysis [41]) is only
possible at the cost of virtually zero embedding capacity;
however, such detectors are difficult to implement in practice.
This paper is organized as follows: Section II explores
related prior art on the subject of improving the security of
LSB embedding against structural steganalysis, and Section
III reviews the family of structural steganalysis techniques. In
Section IV, we introduce the procedure of cover modification
as it is used to secure LSB embedding against SPA in
[40], with some new elements necessary for extending it to
higher-order. Section V develops the new cover modification
procedure to protect against both second- and third-order
structural attacks, and presents results of testing on a data
set of grayscale and color images. In Section VI we discuss
the possibility of extending this methodology to higher-order,
and in Section VII we conclude.
II. RELATED WORK
Due its simplicity, there has been much work on improving
the security of LSB embedding against the ever-escalating
wave of steganalytic attacks. These approaches evade statis-
tical attacks focused on image structures by preserving these
statistics during the embedding process. There are three broad
approaches to this problem: embedding strategies, in which
LSB embedding is only performed on subgroups of pixels
that preserve certain statistics; statistical restoration, in which
portions of the cover image are altered after LSB embedding
to recover certain statistics of the cover image; and cover
modification, in which the cover image is altered prior to
embedding so that the stego image retains certain statistics of
the cover image. Some methods incorporate more than one of
these aspects. We review several relevant works in this section.
The earliest approaches attempted to circumvent histogram-
based attacks. In the work of [42], the histogram is preserved
by encoding the message such that the probabilities of 1’s
and 0’s in the message are precisely those required to keep
the frequencies of adjacent bins unchanged. Some protection
against second-order statistics is conferred if the pixel pairs are
chosen such that their frequencies in the image co-occurrence
matrix are unchanged after the embedding; however, this
method is not protective against second-order attacks like
RS analysis [43]. This procedure is only applicable for high
embedding rates, since otherwise the histogram attack is not
particularly effective. In [44], the histogram-preserving data
mapping introduced under the assumption that pixels are i.i.d.,
embeds data with the same distribution as the cover image
histogram so as to minimize their relative entropy. The i.i.d.
assumption is in general not true for natural images, however,
and so this method is susceptible to higher-order structural
attacks, e.g. as shown in [45].
The LSB+ method of Wu et al. [33] also seeks to preserve
the pixel value histogram by compensating for bits embedded
into a given pair of neighboring bins by appropriately changing
the values of other pixels from these bins reserved for this
3purpose. To protect against second-order attacks, like SPA,
only restricted groupings of pixels are embedded so that these
statistics too can be preserved; the result is that test images
had a very low average embedding capacity of around 2.5%.
Protection against higher-order statistics would result in even
lower embedding capacities. An improvement in capacity is
offered by [34] but this method is equally susceptible to
higher-order structural steganalysis.
With the increasing use of the powerful SPA technique,
steganographers recognized the need to go beyond the preser-
vation of first-order image statistics. In [35], an inverse his-
togram transformation is applied to the cover image prior
to embedding. This operation compresses the range of pixel
values in the cover image, essentially coarse-graining the
image prior to embedding. Since structural attacks like RS and
SPA rely primarily on trace sets with small differences among
neighboring pixels, as these are the most common pairs, the
method of [35] is able to defeat these attacks for a wide
range of embedding rates. To recover the hidden message,
the recipient must reverse the compression. The trouble with
this method is that the compression transformation eliminates
entire pixel values from the stego image, which appear as
empty bins in the image histogram. Analysis of the histogram
enables one to reverse the transformation and then directly
analyze the LSB-embedded image. Lou and Hu [36] correct
this problem by performing multiple transformations with
different parameters on different pixel groups of the cover,
with the result that the combined histogram has no missing
levels. Depending on the pixel grouping strategy, the authors
of [36] acknowledge that this approach could be susceptible
to a brute force attack wherein the steganalyst examines the
histograms of many different pixel groups looking for evidence
of missing levels. As the number of pixel groups grows,
such that the histograms contain ever fewer pixels, missing
levels could occur naturally and the authors argue that in
this case there are insufficient histogram statistics to support
steganalysis. This claim, however, remains to be validated in
general.
An interesting example of statistical restoration is provided
by the method of dynamic compensation [37]. Here the mes-
sage is embedded and the values of half of the image pixels are
increased by one. This has the effect of essentially “resetting”
the statistics of the stego image, and structural steganalysis
is unable to detect any hidden messages. The pixels used
for this compensation must generally be chosen dynamically
such that detection by common structural attacks is minimized.
The main drawback of this method is that message retrieval
requires a reversal of this compensation procedure, and so the
locations of all modified pixels must be communicated to the
recipient. This is a sizable amount of data: for a 512x512
image, this amounts to a 300kB secret key that must be
securely exchanged along with the image. A related approach
was explored in [38] where half of the image LSBs are flipped
after embedding so that SPA and RS tests are fooled into
concluding that images are maximally embedded regardless of
the true embedding rate. While indeed these tests are in error,
it is not clear how this result safeguards the stego image since
such a detection would likely arouse suspicion that the image
was either fully LSB embedded or had at least been tampered
with. Further, message extraction requires knowledge of which
LSBs were flipped so that the this operation can be reversed.
An approach that combines cover modification with an
embedding scheme based on the eight-queens problem is
presented in [39]. Here, each LSB is flipped or not according
to whether its pixel, when taken as part of an eight-pixel
block, is masked by one of the 92 eight-queens solutions.
A group of pixels is reserved to restore set cardinalities to
approximate those of the cover so that SPA is unable to
detect the message. A general upper bound on embedding
capacities is not established in [39], but sample images are
tested up to relative payloads of 30%. This is lower than
the cover modification technique of [40], discussed below,
and similarly does not protect against higher-order attacks.
It should also be noted that message extraction using eight-
queens encoding is greatly more complicated than simple LSB
embedding, and does not confer additional security against
structural steganalysis.
Most recently, the work of [40] considers cover modification
where the cardinalities of sets analyzed by SPA to detect the
presence of LSB steganography are adjusted prior to message
embedding such that the relevant second-order statistics are
preserved in the process. This approach successfully protects
against SPA at the cost of lower embedding capacities, up-
wards to around 50% on average [40]. Though second-order
statistics are carefully preserved in this method, higher-order
statistics can still be targeted by Triples analysis to uncover
the hidden message length.
III. STRUCTURAL STEGANALYSIS
Structural steganalysis refers to a family of techniques that
seek to detect hidden messages in spatial domain images
by analyzing the statistical properties of contiguous groups
of pixels. These methods have had good success detecting
randomized LSB embedding at even low embedding rates.
A. First-order Attacks
First-order statistics, like frequency counts of pixel values,
were the basis of the early histogram-based attacks. Often
referred to in the literature as the histogram attack, the
approach of [1] employs a χ2 test to determine whether
the tendency of LSB embedding to even-out the counts of
consecutive even-odd pixel values can be distinguished from
the histograms of typical cover images. The histogram attack is
particularly useful against serially embedded messages, but is
only effective against randomized embedding when the relative
payload is high, around 1 bit/pixel. The trouble is that first-
order statistics vary considerably from image to image, and so
it is difficult to ascertain whether an image with nearly equal
numbers of even-odd pixel values is hiding data, or whether
it just looks that way naturally.
Also based on the image histogram, the work of [46]
modeled LSB steganography as additive noise and observed
that the smoothing-out of neighboring histogram bins observed
in [1] could be quantified in terms of the center of mass of the
histogram characteristic function. In [46], this attack was only
4tested on a few color images at full embedding capacity, and
so its performance against lower rates has not been carefully
studied. Absent good models of first-order statistics for natural
images, we expect this method to likewise struggle to detect
lower embedding rates.
B. Second-order Attacks
Sample pairs analysis (SPA) [2], [3], [4], [6] considers the
second-order statistics of natural images, and is based on the
premise that natural images of objects with continuous shading
should exhibit fairly small differences between neighboring
pixels, and, for a given pair of such neighboring pixels, (u, v),
we should just as readily expect u < v as v < u. This
assumption is based on the expectation that natural images
have no preferred direction of gradient. It is further supposed
that this parity between pairs with u < v and v < u should
hold regardless of whether u or v happens to even or odd.
It can be shown that LSB embedding spoils this parity in
a distinctive way, and SPA was developed to translate these
observed parity deviations into an estimate of the hidden
message length.
We define a sample pair as a doublet of neighboring pixels
(x1, x2), where each pixel (or channel for color images) takes
on a b-bit value (typically b = 8 bits). All the pairs in an image
form a multiset1, P . Interestingly, LSB embedding does not
change the value bx2/2c − bx1/2c = m of the pair (x1, x2).
All such pairs form the trace set,
Cm = {(x1, x2) ∈ P | bx2/2c − bx1/2c = m}. (2)
Further, a particular pair (x1, x2) falls into one of two different
subsets, where we use the concise notation of Ker [7]:
Em = {(x1, x2) ∈ P |x2 − x1 = m, withx1 even}, (3)
Om = {(x1, x2) ∈ P |x2 − x1 = m, withx1 odd}. (4)
The trace set Cm contains the four subsets: E2m, O2m−1,
E2m+1, and O2m. Now, the trace set Cm is closed under the
action of LSB embedding, and so we expect the number of
pairs in Cm of the cover to be the same as the number of pairs
in the stego image, C′m, that is, |Cm| = |C′m|, where vertical
bars indicate the cardinality of the set. However, the trace
subsets are not closed under LSB embedding, with transitions
occurring according to the diagram in Figure 1. The subsets
transform under LSB embedding according to, E(|E
′
2m|)
E(|O′2m−1|)
E(|E ′2m+1|)
E(|O′2m|)
 =

b2 ab ab a2
ab b2 a2 ab
ab a2 b2 ab
a2 ab ab b2

 |E2m||O2m−1||E2m+1|
|O2m|
 (5)
where a = p, b = 1− p, and p is the probability that the LSB
of a single pixel is changed. The quantity E(|E ′2m|) is the
expectation value of the cardinality of the set E ′2m after LSB
embedding; it is a random variable because the embedding
process is probabilistic. In what follows, though, we will
assume that the measured values of these sets are close to
the expectations and simply write | · | in place of E(| · |).
1A multiset is the generalization of a set to include non-unique elements.
Hereafter we will simply refer to them as sets.
Fig. 1: Transition probabilities of subsets of the trace set Cm.
In terms of the above sets, the SPA2 cover image assumption
can be written simply as |E2m+1| = |O2m+1|; it is clear from
looking at Figure 1 that this condition will in general fail to
hold under LSB embedding. For example, LSB embedding
changes the cardinalities of the subsets E2m+1 and O2m+1
according to
|E ′2m+1| = p(1− p)|E2m|+ p2|O2m−1|
+ (1− p)2|E2m+1|+ p(1− p)|O2m|, (6)
|O′2m+1| = p2|E2m+2|+ p(1− p)|O2m+1|
+ p(1− p)|E2m+3|+ (1− p)2|O2m+2|. (7)
In general, we therefore expect |E ′2m+1| 6= |O′2m+1|.
To infer the embedding rate, α = 2p, we must consider the
inverse of Eq. (5) since the stego image only gives us access
to the primed quantities, |E2m||O2m−1||E2m+1|
|O2m|
 = γ

b2 −ab −ab a2
−ab b2 a2 −ab
−ab a2 b2 −ab
a2 −ab −ab b2

 |E
′
2m|
|O′2m−1|
|E ′2m+1|
|O′2m|
 (8)
where γ = (b − a)−2. Under the assumption |E2m+1| =
|O2m+1|, we obtain the quadratic expression,
α2(|Cm| − |Cm+1|)
+2α(|E ′2m+2|+ |O′2m+2| − 2|E ′2m+1|+ 2|O′2m+1|
−|E ′2m| − |O′2m|) + 4(|E ′2m+1| − |O′2m+1|) = 0. (9)
There is an equation like this for each m, and to obtain α one
option is to sum them all together and solve the resultant single
quadratic equation. Alternatively, the least squares method of
[47] can be used to estimate the value of α that minimizes the
sum of the squared errors,
αˆ = arg min
α
∑
m
(|E2m+1| − |O2m+1|)2. (10)
Because this second approach generalizes well to alternative
cover assumptions that we will be making, we adopt the least
squares approach in this study.
2Often in the literature, the term “SPA” refers specifically to the technique
used in [4] to compute the change rate, p, from Eq. (9); here, we use it
more generally to refer to the 2nd-order structural steganalysis and cover
assumptions that yield Eq. (9.), irrespective of how it is solved.
5Sample pairs analysis using least squares optimization has
proven quite successful at detecting embedding rates as low as
5% [47], and the additional optimizations of [6] have achieved
rates as low as 3% [7]. But, it is possible to do better by
considering the higher-order statistics of larger sets of pixels.
C. Higher-order Attacks
Ker [7] has developed a generalized approach for analyzing
n-tuples of pixels; specifically, he explored whether the car-
dinalities of sets of triplets of consecutive pixels, (x1, x2, x3),
can reveal LSB embedding. Trace sets are defined in this case
as
Cm,n = {(x1, x2, x3) ∈ P | bxi+1/2c − bxi/2c = mi}
(11)
with subsets
Em,n = {(x1, x2, x3) ∈ P |xi+1 − xi = mi ,
withxi even}
Om,n = {(x1, x2, x3) ∈ P |xi+1 − xi = mi
withxi odd} , (12)
with 1 ≤ i ≤ 2. Each trace set has eight subsets: E2m,2n,
O2m−1,2n, E2m+1,2n−1, O2m,2n−1, E2m,2n+1, O2m−1,2n+1,
E2m+1,2n, and O2m,2n. At higher-order, there are more sym-
metries to exploit for detection: there is the analog of the
SPA parity symmetry, |E2m+1,2n+1| = |O2m+1,2n+1|, the
order symmetry, |Em,n| = |En,m| for each m,n (and likewise
|Om,n| = |On,m|), and also a reflectional symmetry that
relates sets under the transformation (m,n) → (−n,−m).
In [7], only the parity symmetry is considered which leads
to a cubic analog of Eq. (9) in terms of the variable q =
1/(1 − 2p). This method, called Triples analysis, has some
interesting properties: it performs rather unpredictably against
stego images with high embedding rates (& 50%), but does
well for lower rates. It showed to be slightly more sensitive
than RS and SPA, detecting embedding rates as low as 4% and
with a lower false alarm rate for uncompressed images; it did
remarkably better than these lower-order techniques against
JPEG-compressed images.
Finally, an analysis of quadruples was also studied [41]. The
cover image symmetries considered were the analog parity
symmetry, the inversion symmetry |Em,n,o| = |O−m,−n,−o|,
and the permutative symmetry |Em,n,o| = |Epi(m,n,o)| for any
permutation, pi. Each of these symmetries provides a separate
estimate of the change rate, p, via a quartic polynomial in
q = 1/(1− 2p). These equations have multiple roots and it is
not clear which one to choose as the best estimate for p: in
[41], Ker suggests selecting the root closest to a prior estimate
of p from SPA or Triples analysis. When this can be done,
the quadruples detector appears to be mostly consistent with
lower-order tests.
IV. COVER MODIFICATIONS TO DEFEAT SPA
Sample pairs analysis is premised on the key assumption
that natural images should satisfy the constraint |E2m+1| ≈
|O2m+1|. Certainly there are exceptions, but a decade’s worth
0
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Fig. 2: The effect of LSB embedding on trace subsets of an original and
modified cover image. On the left are subset cardinalities of the original and
modified cover, and on the right is how these cardinalities change after some
amount of LSB embedding. The dashed horizontal lines are a guide to assess
how well the “stego modified cover” (red) in the right plot resembles the
“modified cover” (black) in the left plot.
of analysis on a variety different image data sets confirms this
hypothesis as generally true. But, what if one could deliber-
ately modify the statistics of the cover image to violate it prior
to LSB embedding? Would it be possible to modify the image
in such a way that, after embedding a secret message, the
statistics of the stego image are returned to those of the original
cover? This technique was recently demonstrated successfully
in [40], and we review it here in our own notation. Hereafter,
we refer to the practice of altering cover image statistics prior
to applying steganography as cover modification.
Schematically, LSB embedding transforms a cover image,
I , into a stego image, I ′, as I ′ = L · I . The basic idea is to
come up with a transformation, T , such that I ′ = LT · I = I .
While the pixel-wise act of embedding into LSB’s cannot be
inverted, we can invert the effects of LSB embedding on trace
subset cardinality. The desired transformation has already been
written down: it is the matrix in Eq. (8). Here, though, we wish
to apply this transformation not to the stego image trace sets,
but the cover image sets,
|EM2m|
|OM2m−1|
|EM2m+1|
|OM2m|
 = γ

b2 −ab −ab a2
−ab b2 a2 −ab
−ab a2 b2 −ab
a2 −ab −ab b2

 |E2m||O2m−1||E2m+1|
|O2m|

(13)
giving us modified trace sets, CMm . The effect on the m = 1
trace subsets of a sample cover image is shown in Figure 2.
Because O1 is larger than E3, Figure 2 (left), there is a net
transfer of pairs from O1 to E3 after LSB embedding (right).
But, if we anticipate these transitions by preemtively moving
pairs from E3 to O1 prior to embedding, the stego image will
exhibit the same statistics as the original cover, that is, the set
cardinalities of trace subsets should be approximately equal
(compare the black “original cover” in Figure 2 (left) with
the red “stego modified cover” on the right). Sets like E3
6from which pairs must be moved to other sets during cover
modification are called donor subsets.
The more data we wish to embed into the cover image,
the more pairs need to be moved out of donor subsets. Since
the donor subsets are of finite cardinality, there is a limit
to the embedding capacity that depends on the particular
cover image. Each trace set, Cm, will have at least one donor
subset, and the amount of data that can be embedded into
pairs belonging to that trace set is constrained by the subset
that empties at the smallest α. In practice, to find this α we
solve each equation of Eq. (13) separately with the left-hand-
side set to zero (corresponding to an empty subset in the
modified cover) and pick the smallest α. Call this αm, the
smallest embedding capacity allowed by trace set Cm. Then,
the maximum embedding capacity allowed for the image is
the minimum capacity of all trace sets, α = min{αm}.
The number of trace sets to modify is arbitrary, though good
results are obtained for −5 ≤ m ≤ 5. This is the same range
of sets found in [7] and [47] to provide reliable detections,
as higher-order trace sets tend to become sparsely populated
and do not reliably satisfy the condition |E2m+1| = |O2m+1|.
Even within the lower-order sets, it might occur that one or
a few trace sets severely constrain α such that their omission
from embedding results in a higher embedding capacity. As an
extreme example, if a single donor set is already empty in any
of the trace sets, the image cannot be embedded at all unless
the pixels in this trace set are excluded from the embedding.
This is very uncommon for pairs analysis, though becomes
more of a problem with higher-order cover modifications as
we will see. We therefore propose the following rule for
identifying the maximum embedding capacity: set α = αm˜,
where,
m˜ = arg max
m
αm
(
1− Sm
N
)
(14)
Sm =
∑
i|αi<αm
|Ci|, (15)
where N is the total number of pixels in the image. We exclude
all trace sets Ci with αi < αm˜ from the LSB embedding
process. The quantity α = αm˜ is the effective maximum
embedding rate that results after these trace sets have been
excluded.
In any case, once the value of α has been obtained, we
are ready to perform the cover modification. This is just a
redistribution of pairs among the trace subsets according to
Eq. (13) with the chosen embedding rate, α. The appropriate
number of pairs are moved out of each donor subset into non-
donor subsets according to their deficits. For color images,
trace sets are adjusted separately for each color channel.
This kind of cover modification has been shown to be
quite effective at evading SPA [40], but what about higher-
order attacks? How does redistributing pixel pairs in this way
affect the distribution of triplets? We perform a test on 1000
512x512 images from the BOSS database3 of uncompressed,
grayscale raster images. LSB steganography was performed
by embedding a pseudo-random bit stream, simulating an
3http://agents.fel.cvut.cz/boss/
encrypted message, into pseudo-randomly selected LSBs at
the embedding capacity of each image. We present results
in Figure 3: black points are the detected embedding rates
using SPA, and the red squares are those using Triples.
The horizontal lines mark the 95% confidence bounds for
a detection with SPA (black) or Triples (red)4. Negative
embedding rates are of course not possible, and are simply how
these algorithms interpret certain set imbalances. But, since
negative α below the lower confidence bound might suggest
that the image has been tampered with, such predictions can
be considered detections. Points that fall on the diagonal are
perfect predictions of the true rate. Only cover images that
are below the SPA detection threshold were selected for cover
modification.
The Triples analysis of [7] is able to detect the presence of a
hidden message in almost every image, and estimate its length
to within 50% accuracy for most. The noisiness observed in
the Triples detections at high embedding rate possibly arises
from the same instability observed by Ker in [7]. And so,
perhaps unsurprisingly, a second-order cover modification is
insufficient for securing LSB embedding against higher-order
structural attacks.
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Fig. 3: The results of SPA and Triples detections on 1000 uncompressed
grayscale rater images with cover modifications made to defeat SPA. Dashed
lines indicate 95% confidence limits for detection by the detector with the
corresponding color.
V. COVER MODIFICATIONS TO DEFEAT BOTH SPA AND
TRIPLES
To understand why the second-order cover modification
did not also provide third-order protections, consider two
consecutive triplets,
m1 m3 m5︷ ︸︸ ︷ ︷ ︸︸ ︷ ︷ ︸︸ ︷
(x1, x2, x3|x4, x5, x6)︸ ︷︷ ︸ ︸ ︷︷ ︸
m2 m4
, (16)
where the mi = xi+1 − xi denote the differences of the
indicated pixel values. The pairs in this sextuplet belong to the
4Confidence limits were established by running SPA and Triples detections
on the raw un-embedded images.
7trace sets Cm1 , Cm3 , and Cm5 . Embedding into this sextuplet
will in general transform all the mi → m′i; however, cover
modifications based on pairs will only adjust pixels according
to the transitions with i = 1, 3, 5. But pixel x3 also belongs
to the first triplet, and so helps determine m2, while pixel x4
belongs to the second triplet and helps determine m4. If pixel
x3 is adjusted during cover modification according only to m3,
as would happen under a second-order cover modification, the
effect on m2 will be essentially random, and likewise for the
effect on m4 of adjusting x4. It would appear that in order
to preserve both second- and third-order statistics after LSB
embedding, we must make cover modifications at sixth-order,
in terms of sextuplets5.
A. Attempt at a full sixth-order solution
In [7], Ker developed an approach to structural steganalysis
to arbitrary order, which we apply here. Trace sets carry five
indices denoting the differences between consecutive pixels in
the sextuplet,
Cm1,...,m5 = {(x1, ..., x6) ∈ P | bxi+1/2c − bxi/2c = mi} (17)
and the subsets are defined analogously to the triplets case,
Em1,...,m5 = {(x1, ..., x6)) ∈ P |xi+1 − xi = mi ,
withxi even}
Om1,...,m5 = {(x1, ..., x6)) ∈ P |xi+1 − xi = mi
withxi odd} . (18)
There are 64 subsets in each Cm1,...,m5 that can enumerated
as follows [7]: first, write A0,m1,...,m5 for Em1,...,m5 and
A1,m1,...,m5 for Om1,...,m5 . Writing the concatenation of two
sequences s and t as s.t, the trace subsets of Ct.k can be
obtained recursively from the subsets As1 ...Asn of Ct as
As1.(2k+β1), ...,Asn.(2k+βn),
As1.(2k+β1+1), ...,Asn.(2k+βn+1) (19)
where βi = 0 if
∑
i si is even and βi = −1 if the sum is odd.
Writing P (Asi ,Asj ) for the transition probability between the
two subsets Asi and Asj we have
P (Asi.(2k+βi),Asj .(2k+βj)) = (1− p)P (Asi ,Asj )
P (Asi.(2k+βi+1),Asj .(2k+βj)) = pP (Asi ,Asj )
P (Asi.(2k+βi),Asj .(2k+βj+1)) = pP (Asi ,Asj )
P (Asi.(2k+βi+1),Asj .(2k+βj+1)) = (1− p)P (Asi ,Asj )
. (20)
Finally, the transition matrices can be obtained recursively
from lower-order matrices via the g-fold Kronecker products,
T1 =
(
1− p p
p 1− p
)
(21)
Tg+1 =
(
(1− p)Tg pTg
pTg (1− p)Tg
)
, (22)
5In what follows, we refer to an nth-order cover modification as one that
adjusts the cardinalities of sets of n-tuples.
and similarly for the inverses,
T−11 =
1
1− 2p
(
1− p −p
−p 1− p
)
(23)
T−1g+1 =
1
1− 2p
(
(1− p)T−1g −pT−1g
−pT−1g (1− p)T−1g
)
. (24)
With so many more subsets per trace set at sixth-order,
there is a real danger that we will encounter trace sets with at
least one empty subset, preventing us from embedding into
that trace set. To find out, we test this cover modification
on 1000 uncompressed grayscale raster images (512x512
PGM format from the BOSS database cited earlier) and 1000
uncompressed color raster images (high-resolution TIF format
from the USDA NRCS archive6 resized to 640x450). Indeed,
all of the trace sets in 20% of the grayscale and 50% of
the color images had at least one empty subset, with the
result that these images could not be modified and so could
not serve as covers. The remaining images in each data set
overwhelmingly contained only a single trace set with no
empty subsets (typically C0,0,0,0,0), with a resulting very low
embedding capacity: 0.01% and 0.02% for grayscale and color,
respectively. Evidently, a full sixth-order cover modification
can only be done at the expense of a virtually empty stego
image.
B. Third-order solutions with partial embedding strategies
The problem with the sixth-order approach is that a single
empty subset excludes all the pixels in its trace set. We cannot
get rid of empty subsets because they are a property of the
cover image which we intend to preserve; but, we can mitigate
the collateral damage their exclusion has on other subsets.
One idea is to reduce the sizes of the trace sets so that the
number of pixels that must be omitted from embedding is
smaller in the event that the trace set contains an empty subset.
One way to reduce the number of subsets per trace set is to
reduce the dimensionality of the transformation: while we are
stuck preserving sixth-order statistics, we are not actually stuck
with the sixth-order transformation, T6, and the corresponding
large 64-dimensional trace sets. At the start of this section, we
argued that the trouble with modifying second- or third-order
statistics such that the other is also preserved lies in the middle
pair, (x4, x5), of the sextuplet Eq. (16). To accommodate these
pixels, we were forced to consider the sixth-order statistics of
the cover, which we’ve just seen is not possible. Alternatively,
we can simply omit these pixels from the embedding,
(x1, x2,
omit︷ ︸︸ ︷
x3|x4 , x5, x6). (25)
Then, m1 and m2 transform solely due to changes to pixels x1
and x2, and m4 and m5 solely to changes to pixels x5 and x6.
The middle index m3 is left unchanged. Cover modification
can be done on triplets, and since only pairs that are fully
inside triplets are embedded, these modifications will work
to preserve second-order statistics as well. In this way, we
6http://photogallery.nrcs.usda.gov/
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Fig. 4: Distribution of maximum embedding rates α for images cover-modified to resist both SPA and Triples steganalysis. Results of 1000 (a) uncompressed
grayscale, (b) uncompressed color, (c) JPEG-compressed color raster images.
break the sixth-order problem up into two separate third-order
problems.
Since only two pixels in each triplet are ever embedded,
each triplet undergoes a second-order transformation governed
by T2 of Eq. (5). The first triplet belongs to either the
trace set {E2m,2n, O2m−1,2n, E2m+1,2n−1, O2m,2n−1} or
{E2m,2n+1, O2m−1,2n+1, E2m+1,2n, O2m,2n}, and the second
triplet to either the trace set {E2m,2n, E2m,2n−1, E2m+1,2n+1,
E2m+1,2n} or {O2m,2n+1, O2m−1,2n+1, O2m+1,2n, O2m,2n},
and so the original 64-dimensional, sixth-order transition ma-
trix decomposes as
64 = 8⊗ 8 = (4⊕ 4)⊗ (4⊕ 4). (26)
The four-dimensional trace sets are smaller and so the damage
incurred from empty subsets is better contained. Subsets are
also much less likely to be empty in the first place since they
are larger and more inclusive. The cost is that we must exclude
1/3 of the image pixels from the embedding process7.
To perform this cover modification, we consider sets with
−5 ≤ m,n ≤ 5. The first triplet in each sextuplet is placed
into the set called P1 and the second into the set called P2.
The maximum embedding capacity is determined by applying
Eq. (15) to P1 and P2 separately, and the smaller of the
7We also considered the strategy of omitting the four middle pixels from
Eq. (16), which, on its face would seem worse since twice as many pixels are
excluded at the outset. But, the trace sets are even smaller in this case and
the subsets even more general, and so the maximum α could be large enough
to compensate for the loss of pixels. The LSB embedding transformation is
composed of two separate families of single-pixel transformations on triplets:
E2m, ↔ O2m−1, with  = 2n, 2n + 1, and O2m, ↔ E2m+1,
with  = 2n, 2n− 1 for the first triple in each sextuplet (in which the first
pixel is embedded); and E,2n ↔ E2m,2n+1 with  = 2m, 2m + 1, and
O2m,2n−1 ↔ O,2n with  = 2m, 2m − 1 for the second triple in each
sextuplet (in which the last pixel is embedded). Each of these transitions
defines a separate trace set, of which there are eight for each m each
with only two subsets: {E2m,,O2m−1,} and {E2m+1,,O2m,} for
triplets (x1, x2, x3); and {E,2m, E2m,2n+1} and {O2m,2n−1,O,2n}
for triplets (x4, x5, x6). The transition matrix decomposes as
64 = 8⊗ 8 =
4⊕
i=1
2i ⊗
4⊕
i=1
2i, (27)
so that each of the eight trace sets are acted on by T1. In comparison with the
strategy in the body, though α tends to be larger for the image types tested,
it does not offset the reduction in capacity from discarding the additional 1/3
of pixels.
two is selected. For almost all images, there were several
omitted trace sets; all included trace subsets were then adjusted
according to the method outlined in Section IV. We test
the effectiveness of this cover modification against SPA and
Triples analysis for the three image data sets: uncompressed
grayscale, uncompressed color, and JPEG-compressed color
raster images (jpg format from the NRCS archive resized to
640x450 and converted to bitmaps). Only cover images that
were consistent with zero embedding at 95% CL according
to both detectors were selected for testing. Some images
nonetheless still lead to detections at this threshold, and so
for these we tuned the embedding rate down until it was no
longer detected by either attack. The distribution of maximum
embedding rates that escape both SPA and Triples detections
are shown in Figure 4 for uncompressed grayscale images
(a) and uncompressed color images (b). Both images formats
support undetectable embedding rates between around 0.05-
0.25 bits per channel (bpc), with an average of 0.12 bpc for
grayscale and 0.17 bpc for color.
For JPEG-compressed images, we find that larger embed-
ding rates are possible, with a range of 0.05-0.40 bpc, and
an average of 0.21 bpc, Figure 4 (c). This result is especially
of interest since Triples analysis has shown to be much more
reliable than pairs analysis at both detecting messages and
estimating their length in JPEG-compressed covers, making
it the last line of defense against these image types. Cover
modifications that resist these attacks at moderate embedding
capacities might therefore be of considerable value.
Before closing this section, we note that since first-order
statistics, namely the quantities characterizing the distribution
of single pixel values, are not adjusted during cover modifi-
cation, the pixel value histogram will reflect LSB embedding.
However, the χ2 inference used to detect LSB embedding is
not discriminating for randomly embedded messages with the
relatively low embedding rates possible with cover modifica-
tion at this order.
C. Message Embedding and Extraction
Since messages are embedded in the LSBs of image pixels,
message extraction is a simple matter of reading off the LSBs
of message-carrying bits. This is in contrast to some of the
9other methods used to defeat SPA, like the inverse histogram
transformation of [35] that must be applied to the image before
bits can be read off. Here, it is assumed that the recipient
knows the partial embedding strategy, and so only extracts
LSBs of pixels x1, x2, x5, and x6 from each sextuplet. As
is standard, the recipient needs a secret key to identify the
pseudo-random path of pixels chosen for embedding. Here,
however, the recipient must also know which pixels have
been omitted from the embedding process so that they can
be ignored during message extraction to avoid errors.
One way of dealing with this is to provide the recipient
with a list of the omitted trace sets. For −5 ≤ m,n ≤ 5,
this is a 2× 112 = 242 bit data structure, where the factor of
two arises from the two separate families of trace sets: those
of triplets (x1, x2, x3) and those of triplets (x4, x5, x6). This
structure can typically be compressed by a factor of 5 or so. If
a covert channel exists between the sender and receiver, this
data can be directly shared. A more convenient and practical
solution is to embed it along with the message into the stego
image. When the receiver extracts the message, it will contain
point errors since all LSBs along the pseudo-random path,
even those of omitted pixels, have been read off. As long as
the list can be recovered without error, however, the recipient
can then exclude the LSBs read from the omitted pixels and
recover the original message. We now describe how this might
be done in practice.
Since the embedded message will typically be encrypted, to
prevent errors during decryption the LSBs of the omitted pixels
should be encrypted along with the message bits. This can be
done as follows: the sender computes a pseudo-random pixel
path through the image, xN , including all pixels irrespective of
whether they belong to an omitted set. Let mK be the string of
length K of message bits to be embedded. Starting with m0, if
x0 is embeddable, then M0 := m0, with M the master string
to be embedded. If x0 is not embeddable, we instead set M0
to some arbitrary value, say M0 := 1. The specific value
is unimportant because this element is merely a placeholder
so that encryption and decryption will be synchronized, as we
will soon see. If the next pixel, x1, is embeddable, then M1 :=
m0; else, M1 := 1. And so on in this way until we reach the
end of mK . The master string will be of length K+No, where
No is the number of omitted pixels in the pseudo-random path
visited over the course of constructing M . The master string
is then encrypted bit-wise, and the encrypted string, M , is
embedded into the image as follows: if M i is a message bit,
embed it into the LSB of xi; otherwise, skip it and the pixel
xi.
The message extracted by the receiver is the string M with
the encrypted placeholders corresponding to the omitted pixels
replaced by their plaintext LSBs (since these were skipped
while embedding M ). From a cryptographic perspective, these
flipped bits are transmission errors and they won’t decrypt
correctly. To ensure that these errors don’t propagate to other
bits, the cipher used to encrypt M must be synchronous.
This way, the receiver can decrypt the extracted message with
encryption errors corresponding only to the LSBs which are to
be omitted anyway. The decrypted list can then be recovered
and the LSBs of omitted pixels dropped to recover the original
m1 m2 m3 m4 m5
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5
m1 1 m2 m3 1 m4
m1 1 m2 m3 1 m4
x'1 x2 x'3 x'4 x5
x6
m6
x'6
bit-wise encrypt
Embed LSBs
m:
x:
M:
M:
x'1 x2 x'3 x'4 x5 x'6
m1 m2 m3 m4x2%2 x5%2
Extract LSBs
m1 X m2 m3 X m4
bit-wise decrypt
m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6
Message Embedding Message Extraction
Fig. 5: Message encryption/embedding (left) and extraction/decryption
(right) processes. Gray squares indicate omitted pixels and red squares indicate
decryption errors. See text for symbol definitions and discussion.
message, mK . This process is illustrated in Figure 5.
This approach only works if the path xN contains a contigu-
ous block of around 50 embeddable pixels (to fit the 50 bit list
without error). Even for the small 512x512 grayscale images
considered in this study, such regions are plentiful with room
to spare. The main drawback of the approach is that message
extraction now requires more work: the recipient must assign
each triplet to a trace set and then drop pixels belonging to
omitted sets. Though this is computationally straightforward,
it slightly mars the minimalism that makes LSB embedding
so attractive.
VI. SECURITY AGAINST HIGHER-ORDER STRUCTURAL
ATTACKS
We have demonstrated that LSB embedding can be secured
against second- and third-order structural attacks. But this
raises the obvious question: is it susceptible to fourth-order
attacks? In principle, yes. The quadruples analysis of [41] was
shown generally effective but difficult to apply, owing to the
uncertainty over which root of the quartic polynomial for q to
select as the predicted change rate. Ker suggests selecting the
root closest to the estimate from a prior detection using SPA or
Triples; however, these methods fail to detect any embedded
message for covers modified according to Section V. It is
therefore unclear how quadruples analysis could be applied
in practice against these kinds of stego images.
An extension of this methodology to provide fourth-order
protections is possible, but we find that embedding capacities
are close to zero. This is due to two factors: the loss of
available pixels from the embedding strategy, and the limits
imposed by donor set cardinality during cover modification.
The embedding strategy is necessary since to preserve all
statistics up to fourth-order, one needs to work with 4×3 = 12-
tuples of pixels and these large trace sets are almost guaranteed
too all have at least one empty subset (easily as big a problem
as with the sixth-order cover modification seen earlier). The
embedding strategy is similar to that considered in Section V:
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at 12th-order, there are no pairs straddling quadruples as there
were at third-order (the “middle pair”), but there are triplets
which would need to be omitted from the embedding for the
same reasons,
(x1, x2, x3, x4|x5, x6, x7, x8|x9 , x10, x11, x12). (28)
This strategy reduces the number of available pixels to 6/12 =
1/2 the total. Average embedding capacities for a fourth-
order cover modification are around 8% of embeddable pixels,
giving a total capacity for the image of around 4%. This is
likely too low to be of any practical use.
In general, the order of the cover modification is the least
common multiple of all relevant orders whose statistics are to
be preserved. Let the highest-order preserved statistic be k, and
let the least common multiple be n. Then, only bk/2c+1 pixels
in the first and last k-tuples in each n-tuple are embeddable
(all the others belonging to tuples that straddle the interior k-
tuples.) The result is that only the fraction 2×(bk/2c+1)/n are
embeddable pixels for a general nth-order cover modification.
For k = 5, this fraction is 1/10 and so on average overall
embedding capacities are less than 1%. We conclude from
this that practical protection against structural steganalysis via
cover modification does not extend beyond k = 3.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This work has explored the extent to which LSB embed-
ding can be made secure against structural steganalysis by
modifying consecutive pixel count statistics of cover images
prior to message embedding. It is observed that modifications
to protect against structural steganalysis at a particular order
do not secure LSB embedding against higher-order attacks.
Given the effectiveness of the third-order Triples analysis of
[7] at detecting moderate LSB embedding rates, particularly
against JPEG-compressed images, we sought in this research
to develop a cover modification that would be protective
against both Sample Pairs and Triples analyses.
We found that the sixth-order cover modification necessary
to preserve both the second- and third-order cover statistics
targeted by Sample Pairs and Triples analyses resulted in
virtually zero embedding capacity. This is because the large,
64-dimensional trace sets overwhelmingly tend to have at least
one empty subset, preventing the redistribution of sextuplets
within that trace set. We therefore considered instead reverting
to a third-order cover modification, but only embedding into
certain pixels so that both second- and third-order statistics
would be preserved. Specifically, if all but the middle two
pixels in each sextuplet are available for embedding, redistri-
bution of pixel triplets also preserves second-order statistics
and moderate embedding rates can be achieved. We find
that for uncompressed color and grayscale raster images,
undetectable embedding rates range from around 0.05-0.30
bpc, with an average of 0.12 bpc and 0.17 bpc, respectively.
For JPEG-compressed color images, we find generally higher
undetectable payloads upwards to 0.40 bpc, with an average
of 0.21 bpc. Since Triples analysis has shown to be superior to
SPA at detecting the presence of messages and estimating their
length in JPEG-compressed images [7], cover modifications
that can defeat Triples are especially salient for this image
type.
We also conclude that cover modifications performed at
higher than third order result in virtually zero embedding
capacity, and so protections cannot be extended beyond Triples
analysis. This finding suggests that quadruples and even
higher-order structural steganalysis should continue to be
matured and developed in the face of these kinds of cover
modifications.
Though accurate and powerful, structural steganalysis is
not the only attack against LSB embedding. For example,
the weighted stego-image [12], [13] and asymptotic uniform
most powerful (AUMP) [10] tests are robust detectors of LSB
embedding that operate according to different principles, and
so are not defeated with these kinds of cover modifications.
It is an open question whether the cover statistics targeted by
structural steganalysis can be modified while also preserving
the cover models exploited by weighted stego-image and
AUMP steganalysis. Our approach might also be extended to
secure against more general pixel grouping geometries like
those explored in the Closure of Sets work of [48], [49].
Lastly, a nagging shortcoming of this methodology is the
need to omit the pixels of entire trace sets in order to increase
the maximum embedding rate. This requires that the recipient
perform the additional work of identifying and removing the
LSBs of the omitted pixels from the extracted data before
a meaningful message can be recovered. Further, of course,
having these pixels available for embedding in the first place
would considerably increase the embedding capacity in many
cases. Future work could explore cover pre-processing (prior
to the modifications studied here) that redistributes pixels in
trace sets with small (and, hence, limiting) donor subsets; such
transfers, however, would not be reversed in the course of LSB
embedding and so would stand as permanent modifications to
the cover image. Such alterations would need to be performed
carefully to avoid the introduction of statistical artifacts, and
hence warrant further study.
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